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The fact that closed timelike curves (CTCs) are permitted by general relativity raises the question
as to how quantum systems behave when time travel to the past occurs. Research into answering
this question by utilising the quantum circuit formalism has given rise to two theories: Deutschian-
CTCs (D-CTCs) and “postselected” CTCs (P-CTCs). In this paper the quantum circuit approach is
thoroughly reviewed, and the strengths and shortcomings of D-CTCs and P-CTCs are presented in
view of their non-linearity and time travel paradoxes. In particular, the “equivalent circuit model”—
which aims to make equivalent predictions to D-CTCs, while avoiding some of the difficulties of
the original theory—is shown to contain errors. The discussion of D-CTCs and P-CTCs is used
to motivate an analysis of the features one might require of a theory of quantum time travel,
following which two overlapping classes of new theories are identified. One such theory, the theory
of “transition probability” CTCs (T-CTCs), is fully developed. The theory of T-CTCs is shown not
to have certain undesirable features—such as time travel paradoxes, the ability to distinguish non-
orthogonal states with certainty, and the ability to clone or delete arbitrary pure states—that are
present with D-CTCs and P-CTCs. The problems with non-linear extensions to quantum mechanics
are discussed in relation to the interpretation of these theories, and the physical motivations of all
three theories are discussed and compared.
PACS numbers: 03.65.-w, 03.65.Ta, 03.67.-a 04.20.Gz
I. INTRODUCTION
There are few areas of physics in which one confronts
the idea of time travel to the past. When it is discussed,
time travel is often associated with particular ways of
thinking about quantum mechanics and quantum field
theory. One often hears the view that in quantum tele-
portation, for example, the teleported information travels
back in time to the point at which entanglement was cre-
ated, before proceeding forward in time to the recipient
[1–4]. Another example might be remarks about anti-
particles in quantum field theory being akin to particles
“travelling backwards in time”. The time travel con-
sidered in this work is rather different. Here it is assumed
that time travel into the past is a possible physical pro-
cess. The question is then: How must quantum mech-
anics be modified to account for time travel? The mo-
tivation for this comes not from within quantum theory
itself, but rather from general relativity and the existence
of spacetime solutions containing closed timelike curves
(CTCs).
CTCs are paths through exotic spacetimes along
which massive particles may travel, apparently forwards
through time, only to return to their own past. As such,
they represent a mechanism for time travel to the past.
The discovery that the Einstein field equations of general
relativity permit spacetime solutions that contain CTCs
[5–7] came as something of a surprise [8]. Many believe
that such spacetimes containing CTCs should not occur
in nature [9, 10]; however, there is no consensus on the
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possibility of precluding such solutions. Spacetimes con-
taining CTCs are globally non-hyperbolic and therefore
are incompatible with standard relativistic quantum field
theory [11]. Such spacetimes typically contain no Cauchy
surfaces [12] and so the initial value problem is not well
defined, making the analysis of matter in such spacetimes
tricky.
Deutsch [13] began a programme for investigating
quantum mechanics along CTCs that uses the quantum
circuit formalism of quantum computation [14]. In this
approach a circuit is used to ferry qubit states along clas-
sical paths between localised regions of spacetime where
they evolve and interact according to unitary quantum
theory; the relativistic effects of CTCs are present only in
the ability to send qubits back in time. In this way, the
resulting theories abstract away from the specific mech-
anism of time travel, and may, therefore, be applicable to
any such mechanism, be it TARDIS, DeLorean, or CTC.
Deutsch’s theory of quantum mechanics with time
travel has come to be known as the theory of D-CTCs.
A second theory of quantum mechanics with time travel
based on the same quantum circuit approach has come
to be known as the theory of P-CTCs, since it uses the
mathematics of postselection [15–17]. P-CTCs are motiv-
ated by “teleporting” quantum states into the past and
are equivalent to being able to postselect on quantum
measurement outcomes.
Science fiction is rife with naïve classical examples of
time travel to the past, almost inevitably leading to vari-
ous paradoxes. To some extent, both D-CTCs and P-
CTCs mitigate such paradoxes. However, both theories
still contain undesirable features that may also be patho-
logical or paradoxical.
The evolution of a state in a region involving time
2travel is expected to be both non-unitary [18–20] and
non-linear [21]. Non-linearity, if present, fundament-
ally changes the structure of quantum theory. The
standard proofs of most central theorems in quantum
mechanics (including no-signalling, no-cloning, general-
ised uncertainty principles, and indistinguishably of non-
orthogonal states) depend on the linearity of the the-
ory. It is therefore of little surprise that: both D-CTCs
and P-CTCs can distinguish non-orthogonal states with
a single measurement and (in certain ontologies) signal
faster than light; D-CTCs can clone arbitrary pure states;
and P-CTCs can delete arbitrary states. Linearity is
also necessary for the equivalence of proper and improper
mixed states in ordinary quantum theory [22, 23] and the
ability of quantum theory to be compatible with many
different interpretations and ontologies [24]. Non-linear
extensions of quantum theory, such as D-CTCs and P-
CTCs, therefore, require careful examination of any on-
tological assumptions as the predictions of the theories
generally depend on them.
Such issues surrounding theories of time travel in
quantum circuits are subtle, and different theories give
different perspectives. As well as containing undesirable
features, both D-CTCs and P-CTCs are more difficult to
interpret than standard quantum mechanics. Since they
are constructed from the abstract quantum circuit form-
alism, any interpretational assumptions behind them are
unclear. One may therefore ask if there could be a the-
ory with fewer undesirable features. Could such a theory
have a more robust physical motivation?
In this paper, the first of these questions is answered
squarely in the affirmative. Several alternative theories of
time travel in quantum mechanics, falling into two over-
lapping classes, are presented. One such theory, called
the theory of T-CTCs (since it uses transition probabil-
ities), is thoroughly developed and seen to have far fewer
problematic features than either D-CTCs or P-CTCs; in
particular, cloning and deleting are impossible and non-
orthogonal states cannot be distinguished with a single
measurement. The second question is more subjective in
its nature, but the theories presented here all have phys-
ical motivations that may be, depending one’s prejudice,
at least as compelling as those of D-CTCs and P-CTCs.
This strongly suggests that the question as to how
quantum mechanics behaves in the presence of time
travel, and specifically CTCs, is far from decided. With
so many potential answers, different insights and criteria
are needed to convincingly select one theory to the ex-
clusion of the others.
Sections II and III of this paper largely consist of a
review of time travel in the quantum circuit formalism,
but they do also contain some new results and define the
notation and concepts used in the later sections. In Sec.
II the framework of quantum circuits with time travel is
developed and classical time travel discussed. In Sec. III
the theories of D-CTCs and P-CTCs are presented with
a discussion of their features. As part of the development
of D-CTCs, the equivalent circuit model—a proposed al-
ternative model of D-CTCs [25, 26]—is shown to contain
errors. Readers familiar with these theories may want to
skim through this section rather rapidly. The meat of
the paper is in Sec. IV where certain desirable features
of any theory of quantum time travel are identified, and
used to find two classes of new theories; from these new
theories that of T-CTCs is selected and fully developed.
Finally, in Sec. V, the theory of T-CTCs is compared
to the previous theories, focussing on their motivation,
shortcomings, and successes.
II. MODELLING TIME TRAVEL WITH
QUANTUM CIRCUITS
A. The Standard Form of Quantum Circuits with
Time Travel
The quantum circuit approach to time travel is based
on a particular form of qubit circuit introduced by
Deutsch [13]. This convenient building block, from which
all other circuits involving time travel can be built, is
here called the standard form circuit. It allows different
circuits and theories to be concisely specified.
The advantage of the quantum circuit model in this
context is that quantum evolution of qubit states is sep-
arated from spatial motion. Quantum interactions de-
scribed by unitary gates are assumed to only occur in
small, freely falling, non-rotating regions of spacetime so
that they obey non-relativistic quantum mechanics. To
include time travel to the past in such a quantum circuit
model is therefore equivalent to saying that the classical
paths qubits take between gates are allowed to go back
in time. The restriction to circuits of qubits may seem
unphysical but it is convenient and expected to be com-
putationally universal [13]; circuits with systems other
than qubits may also be constructed by analogy. Within
this approach, different theories are then defined by their
behaviour when sending qubits back in time. In this pa-
per only finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces are considered
by considering only finite numbers of qubits.
The standard form circuit is a circuit of n + m < ∞
qubits, a single time travel event that occurs in a local-
ised spacetime region [70], and a single unitary quantum
interaction U . This paper does not consider situations in
which the time travel region is not localised in spacetime.
Them qubits that travel back in time are called the chro-
nology violating (CV) qubits, which arrive from their own
future in the state τi and after the interaction are said to
be in the state τf . The remaining n qubits are called the
chronology respecting (CR) qubits, which arrive from the
unambiguous past in the state ρi and emerge into the un-
ambiguous future in the state ρf . Therefore, a standard
form circuit is completely specified by values for n, m,
and U , while a theory for quantum mechanics with time
travel is a specification of ρf given U and ρi. A generic
standard form circuit is illustrated in Fig. 1.
In cases where the CV system is initially known to be
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Figure 1: Schematic diagram for the standard form circuit
described in the text. The n CR and m CV qubits are shown
entering the gate labelled by unitary U . The double bars
represent the time travel event and may be thought of as two
depictions of the same spacelike hypersurface, thus forming
a CTC. The dashed lines represent the spacelike boundaries
of the region in which time travel takes place; CV qubits are
restricted to that region.
in a pure state it may be written as |φ〉 so that τi = |φ〉〈φ|.
Similarly, in cases where the CR system input or output
states are known to be pure, they may be written |ψi,f 〉
so that ρi,f = |ψi,f 〉〈ψi,f |. In Sec. III C 2 it is seen that
in all models of quantum time travel considered here one
may always purify such that ρi is pure.
All theories of quantum time travel presented in this
paper make one additional assumption: Before the in-
teraction U the CR and CV systems are not entangled
so that the state of all n +m qubits is described by the
product state ρi ⊗ τi [27]. In Ref. [28] it is argued that
this is unreasonable as the causal past of the CV qubits
contains ρi and entanglement should therefore be pos-
sible, but that possibility is not considered here because
alternative assignment methods all have undesirable fea-
tures. The problem is one of finding an assignment pro-
cedure that gives a joint state ω to HCR ⊗ HCV given
only a state ρi onHCR. The procedure used here—where
ω = ρi ⊗ τi—is the only one for which: ω is always pos-
itive, TrCV ω = ρi, and mixtures are preserved [29].
B. Time Travel Paradoxes and the Classical Model
In order define the possible types of paradox in time
travel it is useful to leave quantum mechanics to one side
briefly and concentrate on classical time travel. Con-
sider a classical version of the standard form circuit, with
classical states ρ˜i,f and τ˜i,f and some classical dynam-
ical evolution U˜ replacing their quantum counterparts.
An ontic state of a system is a complete physical state
according to some theory, while an epistemic state is a
probability distribution over ontic states reflecting some
observer’s uncertainty of the ontic state.
The standard way of introducing time travel into clas-
sical theories is to impose a consistency condition on
states that go back in time; that is, τ˜i = τ˜f
def
= τ˜ , where
τ˜ is an ontic state. In other words, the ontic state that
emerges in the past is required to be the same one that
left from the future. With knowledge of an ontic state
ρ˜i and U˜ , a consistent τ˜ can be deduced, from which ρ˜f
may be calculated.
There are two distinct types of paradox that may arise
when considering time travel to the past classically: para-
doxes of dynamical consistency and paradoxes of inform-
ation. In this paper a slightly unconventional view on
paradoxes is taken whereby a computation, which al-
gorithmically produces unambiguous output from an in-
put, is never paradoxical. So a theory that predicts “ab-
surdly” powerful communication or computational abil-
ities will not be called paradoxical because of them, even
if those abilities make the theory appear unreasonable
or hard to accept. The “absurd” ability of time travel
has been assumed, so one should expect some “absurd”
conclusions.
A dynamical consistency paradox is a situation in
which a consistent history of events is not possible
[13, 16, 17]. The “grandfather paradox”, in which a grand-
patricidal time traveller goes back to kill their infant
grandfather, is the usual example of such a paradox. Dy-
namical consistency paradoxes arise when a theory fails
to specify any valid final state from some initial state
and evolution. Classically, this occurs because the con-
sistency condition is rendered unsatisfiable either for a
particular set of possible ρ˜i or for all ρ˜i [71]. There are
three options to avoid these paradoxes when they arise
in a theory: disallow time travel in that theory; only al-
low time travel with certain interactions that avoid these
paradoxes; or enforce retrospective constraints on the ini-
tial conditions. The first option is contrary to the ob-
ject of study and is not considered. Retrospective con-
straints are insufficient to prevent paradox when interac-
tions exist that preclude any consistent input; therefore,
such interactions must be disallowed from any theory of
time travel. Reference [13] and references therein discuss
whether such retrospective constraints are acceptable.
Information paradoxes are situations with consistent
dynamics in which information appears that has no
source; viz., the information has not been computed. The
prototypical example is the unproven theorem paradox:
A mathematician reads the proof of a theorem, travels
back in time and writes the proof down in a book; the
younger version of the same mathematician learns this
proof from said book and subsequently goes back in time
in order to fulfil their destiny of writing the proof down
[13, 16, 17, 30, 31]. The proof appears to have emerged
from nowhere. A quantum circuit that models this para-
dox was given in Ref. [16] and is illustrated in Fig. 2.
The circuit consists of a CR “book” qubit B, a CR “math-
ematician” qubit M , and a CV “time traveller” qubit T .
In the standard form this circuit has n = 2, m = 1,
and U = SWAPMTCNOTBMCNOTTB. The input
is taken to be the pure state |0〉B|0〉M . The interpret-
ation is that the time traveller writes the theorem in
the book (CNOTTB), the mathematician then reads the
book (CNOTBM ), and finally the mathematician and
time traveller swap places (SWAPMT ) so that the math-
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Figure 2: Circuit diagram for the unproven theorem circuit
of Ref. [16] in the standard form. The book qubit is la-
belled B, mathematician labelled M , and time-traveller la-
belled T . The input to the circuit is taken to be the pure
state |0〉B |0〉M . The notation used for the gates is the stand-
ard notation as defined in Ref. [14] and describes a unitary
U = SWAPMTCNOTBMCNOTTB .
ematician may go back in time to write the theorem. Us-
ing N copies of the circuit (n = 2N and m = N) enables
the mathematician to encode a theorem in an N -bit bin-
ary string.
Under the definitions above, information paradoxes
arise if and only if a theory contains a uniqueness ambigu-
ity: The theory specifies more than one final state given
some initial state and evolution, but fails to give probab-
ilities for each possibility. The reason for this is simple:
Any other dynamically consistent evolution is counted as
a computation and information paradoxes are defined to
be exactly those dynamically-consistent situations where
an uncomputed output is produced. For example, in the
classical unproven theorem paradox there are many time
travelling states τ˜ compatible with the consistency condi-
tion, each producing a different ρ˜f—one τ˜ produces a the-
orem answering P
?
= NP, another answering BPP
?
= BQP,
many others where the “theorem” is nonsense, etc. It
should be noted that this conclusion on the equivalence
of time travel situations with uniqueness ambiguity and
those with information paradoxes is not one that is gener-
ally accepted, but it follows from the definitions used here
as described above. Readers preferring different defini-
tions may replace each further instance of “information
paradox” with “uniqueness ambiguity” without affecting
the meaning.
Some authors prefer a wider definition of paradox, in
which time travel circuits constructed such that the only
consistent evolution reveals a fixed point of some given
function is counted as an information paradox [13, 30].
Such a circuit uniquely produces the solution to a prob-
lem that is hard if P 6= NP [32] very rapidly, and as
such is counted as a very powerful computation rather
than a paradox as defined here. This is not to claim that
such processes are necessarily reasonable, but rather to
reflect that they are qualitatively different from the non-
unique situations equivalent to information paradoxes by
the definitions of this paper. Nonetheless, it is worth not-
ing that both D-CTCs and P-CTCs are also capable of
solving for fixed points in this way.
By contrast, uniqueness ambiguity is required to cause
information paradoxes such as the unproven theorem
paradox. If there were no uniqueness ambiguity then any
information that appears as a result of the time travel cir-
cuit is uniquely specified by the structure of, and input
to, the circuit [30]. It is therefore reasonable to say that
this circuit is algorithmically computing as instructed.
III. D-CTCS AND P-CTCS
A. D-CTCs
One may construct the theory of D-CTCs rapidly by
following Ref. [33] and assuming that reduced density
operators are ontic states [72]. Just as in the classical
model, a consistency condition τi = τf
def
= τ should be im-
posed on the ontic time travelling states. In the standard
form this implies
τ = D(τ)
def
= TrCR[U(ρi ⊗ τ)U †]. (1)
Since the partial trace is used to separate CR and CV
systems a consistent approach then suggests that the final
state should be
ρf = TrCV[U(ρi ⊗ τ)U †]. (2)
Essentially, the ingredient that makes D-CTCs different
to ordinary unitary quantum mechanics is the map
U (ρi ⊗ τ)U † → ρf ⊗ τ, (3)
which replaces the general quantum state after U with
the product of its reduced density operators. The point
at which the non-quantum map described in Eq. (3) is
supposed to occur is not defined, and so there is a dynam-
ical ambiguity in the theory. However, this ambiguity is
entirely without observable consequence since all local
observations on separated parts of a bipartite system are
entirely dictated by the reduced density operators, and
Eq. (3) simply maps a bipartite system onto the product
of its reduced density operators [34].
Equations (1) and (2) define the theory of D-CTCs in
its barest form: To find ρf given ρi and U , one solves
Eq. (1) to obtain τ and then evaluates Eq. (2). Note
that the equation of motion (2) is both non-linear and
non-unitary for general ρi and U .
The superoperator D is the Stinespring dilation
form [14, 35] of an ordinary linear quantum channel.
Schauder’s fixed point theorem [36–38] guarantees that
any trace-preserving quantum channel between density
operators has at least one fixed point τ . Therefore, any
D-CTC with any unitary and input state can be solved
for an output state ρf and D-CTCs are not vulnerable to
dynamical consistency paradoxes that are present clas-
sically, despite being based on a very similar consistency
condition. Direct and instructive proofs of this can be
found in Refs. [13, 39].
51. The Uniqueness Ambiguity in D-CTCs
Whilst a solution of Eq. (1) for τ always exists, this
solution is not always unique; therefore, D-CTCs contain
the same uniqueness ambiguity present in classical time
travel. As such, they are vulnerable to unproven theorem
paradoxes. Most theorems involving D-CTCs in the lit-
erature use circuits that permit only a single solution for
τ and thereby avoid this ambiguity, but it is present in
general.
Consider the unproven theorem circuit of Sec. II B.
Solving Eq. (1), one finds a family of CV states, τ =
α|0〉〈0| + (1 − α)|1〉〈1|, and a corresponding family of
output states,
ρf = α|0〉B〈0| ⊗ |0〉M 〈0|+ (1− α)|1〉B〈1| ⊗ |1〉M 〈1|, (4)
for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. As such, there is a continuous one-
parameter family of possible solutions in the D-CTC case
and it is seen that D-CTCs are vulnerable to the un-
proven theorem paradox.
In Ref. [13] the maximum entropy rule was suggested
to resolve this ambiguity. The rule states that one should
choose the consistent τ with the greatest von Neumann
entropy S(τ). This always specifies a unique τ due to lin-
earity of D and concavity of S [27] and was motivated by
a desire to limit the ability of D-CTCs to solve fixed point
problems in the manner discussed in Sec. II B. However,
since the maximum entropy rule has not been universally
accepted and other possible principles exist [27, 28], in
this paper it is viewed as a non-essential extension to
the theory of D-CTCs. In the case of the unproven the-
orem circuit discussed above, the maximum entropy rule
would uniquely specify α = 12 . The interpretation of
the unproven theorem circuit for this solution is that the
“book” B contains an equal mixture of all possible “the-
orems” (most of which will be nonsense) and is useless,
so this also resolves the unproven theorem paradox for
this example.
By allowing for some noise along the path of the CV
system, it may be possible to avoid the uniqueness am-
biguity. Note that, as a consistency condition, Eq. (1)
must be exactly, rather than approximately, satisfied. In
order to incorporate noise into a D-CTC circuit, one must
modify the circuit, including a new quantum channel N
responsible for the noise. Equation (1), is therefore modi-
fied to τ = N(D(τ)), where D remains the quantum chan-
nel associated with the noiseless circuit. Suppose that the
noise N is modelled with a depolarising channel [14] such
that depolarisation occurs with probability 0 < p < 1.
The consistency condition then becomes
τ =
p
2m
1+ (1− p)D(τ). (5)
Now suppose that two density operators satisfying Eq.
(5) differ by ∆τ . By linearity of D, ∆τ = (1 − p)D(∆τ)
and therefore the solution to Eq. (5) can only be non-
unique if (1 − p)−1 is an eigenvalue of D. In a finite-
dimensional Hilbert space, such as those of finitely many
qubits considered here, D has a discrete spectrum of ei-
genvalues [40], while (1−p)−1 takes arbitrary values from
a continuum. Therefore, (1 − p)−1 will not generally be
an eigenvalue of D so the addition of an arbitrary depol-
arising channel specifies τ uniquely. It therefore appears
that the addition of noise to the CV system may solve
the uniqueness ambiguity without need for the maximum
entropy rule. The conjecture that by considering general
noise on the CV system the uniqueness ambiguity may be
avoided is supported by the observation in Ref. [28] that
the subspace of unitaries that give rise to the uniqueness
ambiguity with D-CTCs is of measure zero. However, the
uniqueness ambiguity is still present in the theory, even
if it disappears under small noise.
2. Interpretation of D-CTCs
D-CTCs were introduced above by assuming that dens-
ity operators are ontic, and reasoning that one should
require consistency of ontic states in time travel. This
interpretation is favoured in Ref. [33], in which D-CTCs
are reviewed from an epistemic perspective and found to
be inconsistent.
While issues with such an epistemic interpretation were
recognised by Deutsch, he did not present any ontolo-
gical assumptions from which the theory is derived [13].
He did, however, favour an interpretation in terms of
Everettian quantum theory [24, 41]. This provides an in-
terpretation for the disentanglement process in D-CTCs
expressed in Eq. (3): When a system traverses a D-
CTC, it passes between Everettian branches into a dif-
ferent “world” from the one from which it left.
As presented, the entanglement breaking map Eq. (3)
has similarities with the “collapse” of the state on meas-
urement in ordinary quantum mechanics. Whilst it is
entirely unobservable, on an interpretational level this
disentanglement process needs to be accounted for in a
way similar to the apparent post-measurement state col-
lapse of standard quantum mechanics. The Everettian
view of Ref. [13] is one way of approaching this.
3. The Equivalent Circuit Model
The equivalent circuit model of D-CTCs is a proposed
alternative model for D-CTCs [25, 26] that attempts to
remove two ambiguities from the theory: the uniqueness
ambiguity and the treatment of mixed states by the the-
ory (Sec. III C). In this section it is demonstrated that,
in its standard presentation, the equivalent circuit model
fails to generally reproduce the theory of D-CTCs and
that the proof given for the resolution of the uniqueness
ambiguity contains errors.
The equivalent circuit model is defined for standard
form circuits and is outlined in Fig. 3. The unitary V
differs from the U found in the corresponding standard
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Figure 3: The equivalent circuit model. (a) A circuit equival-
ent to the standard form of Fig. 1 with V = SWAPU . (b)
The same circuit “unwrapped” in the equivalent circuit model.
There is an infinite ladder of unwrapped circuits, each with
the same input state ρi. To start the ladder, an initial CV
state σ0 is guessed. The CV state of the Nth rung of the
ladder is σN . The output state ρf is taken after a number
N →∞ of rungs of the ladder have been iterated.
CR Hilbert spaces. Unitarity is restored by “unwrapping”
the circuit so that each time a system goes back in time,
there is a new copy of the circuit, as shown in Fig. 3(b).
These copies of the circuit form a infinite “ladder”, the
“rungs” of which are CV qubit paths. The unwrapped
circuit, therefore, has infinitely many outputs from which
one, infinitely far up the ladder, is selected.
Following Ref. [25], the standard way of calculating
with these unwrapped equivalent circuits is to find τ by
starting the infinite ladder of circuits with a guess for τ ,
which is here called σ0 [73]. The state of the CV system
on the Nth “rung” of the ladder of circuits is given by
σN = D
N (σ0), D(σ) = Tr2[V (ρi ⊗ σ)V †] (6)
where the partial trace is taken over the final n qubits
in the tensor product [lower arm in each unitary in Fig.
3(b)]. Note that D is exactly as defined in Eq. (1). The
claim of the equivalent circuit model is that, since D al-
ways has fixed points, iterating D as in Eq. (6) will al-
ways cause σN to converge to a fixed point of D; i.e.,
τ = limN→∞ σN : “Deutsch showed that such a fixed
point always exists, so the assumed convergence is guar-
anteed” [25]. This is not generally correct and counter
examples can be constructed. For example, suppose that
n = m = 1 and V = (X1 ⊗ 12)(CNOT1,2)(SWAP),
with the control qubit for CNOT being the upper arm
of the unitary as illustrated in Fig. 3 and X1 the Pauli
X unitary applied to the same qubit. Starting with
ρi = σ0 = |0〉〈0| results in subsequent σN alternating
between |1〉〈1| and |0〉〈0| and the corresponding ρf al-
ternating between |0〉〈0| and |1〉〈1|, never converging. So
repeated action of D does not generally reproduce the
consistency condition as claimed.
Another claim of the equivalent circuit model is that,
given arbitrarily small decoherence along the CV system,
the maximum entropy rule is reproduced and is equival-
ent to simply choosing σ0 ∝ 1. Notwithstanding the com-
ments of the previous section and the argument above,
it is now shown that the argument justifying this claim
presented in the appendix of Ref. [25] is mistaken.
Suppose that repeated action of D does cause conver-
gence to a fixed point and write τ(ρi, σ0) for the fixed
point converged to when the iteration starts from σ0 and
the input state is ρi. In Eq. (A3) of Ref. [25] the en-
tire process of convergence to a fixed point is written
as a Kraus decomposition with Kraus operators {Ej}j
[14, 42]. The reasoning then follows
τ(ρi, σ0) = lim
N→∞
D
N (σ0) =
∑
j
Ejσ0E
†
j
∑
j
Ejσ0E
†
j =
∑
j,k
EjEkσ0E
†
kE
†
j (7)
∑
j,k
EjE
†
kEkσ0E
†
j =
∑
j,k
EjEkσ0E
†
kE
†
j
where the second line follows since τ is a fixed point. It
is then claimed that this implies that [Ejσ0, E
†
j ] = 0.
This is not true generally; for example, it would imply
that τ(ρi, σ0) = σ0 for all σ0 and therefore, by the as-
sumption that τ(ρi, σ0) is a fixed point, that every σ0 is
a fixed point of D. Thus, the claimed proof is, at best,
incomplete.
It may be possible to salvage the equivalent circuit
model in such a way that performs as advertised, but
the above discussion shows that the model and its proofs
need careful revision before it does so.
4. Computation with D-CTCs
In Ref. [43] it was proved that D-CTCs are able to
compute any problem in the complexity class PSPACE in
polynomial time, meaning that D-CTCs are thought to
be vastly more powerful than even quantum computers,
which can calculate problems in BQP. In the same pa-
per, there is a proof that classical computers with time
travel are also able to compute any problem in PSPACE
in polynomial time. However, it should be noted that the
model of classical time travel used in that proof is differ-
ent from the model of Sec. II B. In particular, in Ref. [43]
classical time travel does not impose a consistency con-
dition on ontic classical states τ˜ , but rather on classical
epistemic states of the time travelling system; viz., prob-
ability distributions over possible τ˜ . Such a model for
classical time travel does not seem physically motivated,
as classical probability distributions are assumed to be
entirely due to observer ignorance rather than anything
intrinsically physical. It does, however, have the pleas-
ing computational property of not suffering dynamical
consistency paradoxes. Therefore, claims that classical
computers with time travel have the power of PSPACE,
or that they are equivalent to quantum computers with
time travel, should be taken with caution as they are
based on an unusual model of classical time travel.
It is worth noting that D-CTCs can also produce dis-
continuous maps from ρi to ρf [27]. For all practical
purposes, the theory loses predictive power when the in-
put state is close to one of these discontinuities in a sim-
ilar way that the onset of chaos causes loss of predictive
power about a classical dynamical system.
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Figure 4: Schematic diagram illustrating the protocol defining
the action of P-CTCs as described in the text. When Alice
measures the final state of the B and A qubits to be |Φ〉, the
standard teleportation protocol would have Bob (who holds
the other half of the initially entangled state) then holding
the state with which Alice measured the A system. There
are two unusual things about this situation: first, that Bob’s
system is the same one that Alice wants to teleport, just at
an earlier time, and, second, that Alice can get the outcome
|Φ〉 with certainty and so no classical communication to Bob
is required to complete the teleportation.
B. P-CTCs
The theory of P-CTCs is due to Svetlichny [15], in-
spired by Coecke’s work on diagrammatic approaches to
quantum mechanics [74], and Lloyd et al. [16, 17], based
on the unpublished work of Bennett and Schumacher [44]
and inspired by the Horowitz-Maldacena final state con-
dition of black hole evaporation [45]. The core idea is
to use the ordinary quantum mechanical teleportation
protocol as a basis for teleporting qubits into the past.
Reference [23] contains an accessible introduction.
The theory of P-CTCs is defined by ignoring the mech-
anism behind time travel and postulating only that the
result is mathematically equivalent to teleportation into
the past, achieved by the following unphysical opera-
tional protocol schematically illustrated in Fig. 4.
Prepare 2m qubits, half labelled A and half B, in the
maximally entangled state |Φ〉 = 2−m2 ∑i |i〉B|i〉A, where{|i〉}i is any orthonormal basis for m qubits. Treat the
B qubits as the CV system and let them interact with
the CR qubits as normal. After the interaction, per-
form a joint projective measurement on the B and A
qubits in a basis that includes |Φ〉, but postselect on the
outcome |Φ〉. This is equivalent to simply projecting the
tripartite system of CR, B, and A qubits onto 〈Φ| and
then renormalising the resulting state. Comparing this
to the standard multi-qubit quantum teleportation pro-
tocol, the effect is to “teleport” the final state of the B
qubits back onto the B qubits in the past. This protocol
may be simulated in the laboratory by manual postselec-
tion of measurement outcomes [15, 16].
The effect of this protocol on CR qubits initially in the
pure state |ψi〉 is (up to renormalisation)
BA〈Φ|UCR,B|ψi〉|Φ〉BA = 2−m
∑
i
B〈i|UCR,B|i〉B |ψi〉
∝ TrCV(U) |ψi〉 (8)
where subscripts denote the subsystems to which states
belong or upon which operators act. Generalising this
result to mixed input ρi and renormalising the output to
a valid unit-trace density operator shows that the evolu-
tion effected by a P-CTC is
ρi → ρf = PρiP
†
Tr(PρiP †)
, P
def
= TrCV(U). (9)
This evolution is non-linear due to the renormalisation
and non-unitary due to the partial trace. Considered
as a map applied to the CR qubits, Eq. (9) completely
specifies the action of P-CTCs, and, as such, one may
prefer to forget about the protocol described above and
instead define the action of a P-CTC to be given by Eq.
(9) [75]. With this mindset, the protocol demonstrates
that P-CTCs are equivalent to quantum teleportation to
the past.
Since Eq. (9) maps each ρi onto a specific ρf without
ambiguity, P-CTCs do not suffer the uniqueness am-
biguity present classically and in D-CTCs and so are
not vulnerable to information paradoxes. Applying the
P-CTC protocol to the unproven theorem circuit de-
scribed in Sec. II B produces pure output |ψf 〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉B|0〉M + |1〉B|1〉M ). The output of N such cir-
cuits will always be an equal superposition of all possible
theorems and the paradox is avoided.
The operator P defined in Eq. (9) is not a unitary
operator, but the partial trace of a unitary operator. It
does not, therefore, preserve arbitrary vector norms, but
vector norms are still bounded from above. Consider P
acting on a vector |ψ〉 of the CR system, and let {|α〉}d−1α=0
be an orthonormal basis on the d-dimensional CV system.
Using the triangle inequality and unitarity it is found that
‖P |ψ〉‖ ≤
∑
α
‖〈α|U |ψ〉|α〉‖
≤
∑
α
‖U |ψ〉|α〉‖ = d ‖ψ‖ . (10)
1. Dynamical Consistency and Noise
P-CTCs suffer from dynamical consistency paradoxes.
The unphysical protocol described above necessarily fails
when there is no |Φ〉 component in the state on which to
project, viz. when Alice has zero probability of obtaining
|Φ〉 as her measurement outcome. In this case PρiP † = 0
and no output state is defined.
Most authors interpret this to mean that such evol-
utions “[do] not happen” [16, 17, 23]. In terms of the
discussion in Sec. II B, this is avoiding paradox by en-
forcing retrospective constraints to prevent inputs that
would produce a paradox. However, there are also P-
CTC circuits where all inputs lead to a dynamical con-
sistency paradox. One simple, if contrived, example is
to have U = V ⊗W , where W is traceless, since then
P = V TrW = 0 regardless of the input state.
8If one considers some arbitrary noise on the CV sys-
tem then dynamical inconsistency is avoided. So whilst
the paradoxes are in the theory, one would never expect
a realistic system to encounter one. The reason for this
is that noise will always introduce an arbitrarily small
component to the state which is consistent. Consider the
tripartite state in the operational protocol before postse-
lection σ = U(ρi ⊗ |Φ〉〈Φ|)U † and consider some noise
channel N which acts as N(σ) = (σ + ǫχ)/(1 + ǫ), where
χ is some density operator (which may generally depend
on σ) satisfying 〈Φ|χ|Φ〉 6= 0 and ǫ > 0. If N acts before
the postselection, then it is seen that if 〈Φ|σ|Φ〉 = 0 then
the output state after postselection is
ρf =
〈Φ|χ|Φ〉
Tr〈Φ|χ|Φ〉 (11)
independent of ǫ. Any arbitrarily small random noise will
therefore ensure dynamical consistency of P-CTCs, since
noise of this type can never be totally eliminated.
2. Physicality
The P-CTC formalism as described does not address
the mechanism of time travel. Moreover the protocol de-
scribed above to calculate the effect of P-CTC circuits is
manifestly unphysical. Svetlichny described the formal-
ism as only “effective quantum time travel” [15] that one
might achieve in the laboratory by manual postselection,
while Lloyd et al. motivated the approach stating that a
CTC is a communication channel into the past and that
quantum teleportation represents a quantum communic-
ation channel which can be made to communicate to the
past as described above [17].
Despite the unphysicality of the approach, the intro-
duction of noise in Sec. III B 1 is consistent with the as-
sumption that P-CTC theory produces real effects from
real states and unitaries. In the same way as for D-CTC
circuits, noise may be introduced to P-CTC circuits by
modifying the states and unitaries used accordingly. In-
serting such modified elements is equivalent to modify-
ing them in the P-CTC protocol, even if the protocol is
merely a calculational tool.
The path integral approach of Politzer does give some
physical motivation to the theory of P-CTCs [28]. Path
integrals form an alternative to quantum circuits as a
general approach to theories of quantum mechanics along
CTCs [11, 21, 28, 46]. In Ref. [17] it is shown that
P-CTC dynamics is compatible with the Politzer path
integral approach. Neither standard P-CTCs nor Politzer
path integrals assign states to particles along the CTC.
For certain mechanisms of time travel this may not be
problematic, but it would be puzzling if such a state were
not defined for a CTC.
One could argue that the theory of P-CTCs has a
similar dynamical ambiguity to D-CTCs since Eq. (9)
defines a physical change to the state and the point at
which this change is made is not defined in the theory.
Just as with D-CTCs, this dynamical ambiguity has no
observable consequences. Also, similarly to the case with
D-CTCs, there is an ambiguity about how to treat mixed
states in this non-linear theory, which is addressed in Sec.
III C.
3. Computation
P-CTCs are able to solve any problem in PP in poly-
nomial time [17], meaning that P-CTCs are thought to
be more powerful than standard BQP quantum computa-
tion. This is because quantum mechanics with P-CTCs is
computationally equivalent to quantum mechanics with
postselection [23] and quantum mechanics with postse-
lection has the computational power of PP [47]. PP is
contained within PSPACE and is thought to be strictly
smaller [48]. Therefore, D-CTCs are at least as computa-
tionally powerful as P-CTCs, and thought to be strictly
more powerful.
Unlike D-CTCs, P-CTCs are unable to produce dis-
continuous evolutions because of the more mild form of
non-linearity exhibited, as shown in Sec. III C 1.
C. Mixed states and Non-linearity
1. Non-linearity
The most general possible form of non-linearity in an
equation of motion is due to the input state appearing
at quadratic or higher orders. D-CTCs are an example
of this: Equation (2) depends on ρi directly, but also
indirectly since τ depends on ρi.
A special case of non-linearity is renormalisation non-
linearity, where the equation of motion is linear except
for a linearly-determined scalar factor which simply nor-
malises the final state. P-CTCs are examples, since Eq.
(9) would be entirely linear were it not for the denomin-
ator, which is simply a normalisation factor. A non-linear
equation may be called polynomial non-linear if it is not
renormalisation non-linear.
One way in which renormalisation non-linear equations
are more mild than polynomial non-linear equations is
that the former are not able to lead to discontinuous state
evolutions. Consider some input ρi from some vector
space V and some linear equation of motion M(ρi) ∈ V .
The output is required to be normalised N (ρf ) = 1 for
some linear function N : V → R and so we have
ρf (ρi) =
M(ρi)
N (M(ρi)) ∈ V. (12)
This is a general form for a renormalisation non-linear
equation, and it is simple to see that the state evolution
is always continuous since for any σ ∈ V
lim
ǫ→0
ρf (ρi + ǫσ) = ρf (ρi). (13)
9Compare this to D-CTCs, which are able to produce non-
linear state evolutions.
2. Types of Mixed State
In quantum theory one normally identifies two possible
types of mixed state: proper mixtures as a result of ignor-
ance of an observer regarding the ontic state of a system
and improper mixtures as a result of only having access
to part of an entangled system. Both are described us-
ing density operators with those for improper mixtures
often called reduced density operators. Mixtures giving
rise to the same density operator act identically in all re-
spects regardless of type; they differ only in preparation
procedure and interpretation.
This equivalence is instrumental in enabling quantum
theory to have multiple consistent interpretations. For
example, in Everettian quantum theory there are typ-
ically no proper mixtures, only improper mixtures [76],
whereas an objective collapse interpretation would allow
both types of mixture.
In a theory with non-linearity, however, it is not valid
to describe proper mixtures using density operators. This
follows immediately because, for a non-linear equation of
motion M(·) acting on some ensemble of states and cor-
responding probabilities {(ρj, pj)}j , applying M to the
initial density operator is not generally the same as the
density operator obtained by applying M to each indi-
vidual state in the ensemble:
M(
∑
j
pjρj) 6=
∑
j
pjM(ρj). (14)
On the other hand, density operators are the correct way
to describe improper mixtures under non-linear evolu-
tion. By examining the derivation of reduced density
operators, as given in [14] for example, it is easily seen
that linearity of operations is not assumed at any point.
There is a third type of mixed state, identified in Refs.
[13, 23], that is rarely discussed but must be taken into
account when discussing time travel. Normally, one as-
sumes that the primitive states of quantum theory are
pure states, implying that the state of the entire universe
is pure, a claim that is mathematically justified due to
the purification theorem [14]. One can relax this assump-
tion and allow mixed states to be primitive states; such
mixtures are called true mixtures: mixtures that are not
entangled to any reference system and yet would still be
described as mixed by an observer with maximum know-
ledge. Ontologically true mixtures are therefore distinct
from both proper and improper mixtures. Since D-CTCs
are capable of sending pure states to mixed states (see,
for example, Sec. III A 1), mixtures arising in this way
must be true mixtures, which inevitably arise in a the-
ory with D-CTCs. Moreover, the state τ defined by a
D-CTC circuit cannot generally be purified and must be
thought of as a true density operator [49].
Because reduced density operators are still valid ways
of describing improper mixtures when non-linear evolu-
tions are possible, it follows that non-linear equations do
not treat true and improper mixtures differently. This in-
cludes all theories of time travel presented in this paper.
So whilst theories of time travel may introduce true mix-
tures conceptually, they do not affect the way in which
calculations are performed. As such the purification the-
orem still holds for ρi and one may always assume that
ρi = |ψi〉〈ψi| by simply extending U to act on the puri-
fication ancilla as the identity.
3. Non-linearity and Information Processing
Perhaps the most contentious ambiguity related to the-
ories of quantum mechanical time travel is how non-
linearity affects information processing.
In Ref. [50] it is argued that D-CTC devices that at-
tempt to implement information processing tasks on pure
state inputs are impotent in realistic situations. The ar-
gument supporting this is that realistic input to a useful
device is always uncertain: Any of a range of possible in-
puts could be chosen. It is argued that any useful device,
therefore, acts on mixed state inputs. However, if the
device is non-linear then the desired processing, proven
to work on pure state inputs, does not simply generalise
to the realistic mixed input and so the device will not
behave as advertised. This is called the “linearity trap”
[50].
To resolve this tension, careful attention needs to be
paid to assumptions regarding the ontology of states [23,
25, 51–53]. In ordinary quantum mechanics one does
not generally need to make such ontological assumptions
explicit in order to calculate correctly; however, in a non-
linear theory proper and improper mixtures are no longer
operationally equivalent and therefore ontology becomes
important.
A guiding principle may be stated as follows.
In any extension of quantum theory including
non-linearity, the dynamics of a system S may
generally depend on more than its quantum
mechanical state. One may need to take into
account the entire ontic system of which S is
a part and also the manner in which it was
prepared in order to consistently deduce its
dynamics.
In particular, one should be explicit as to when a mixed
state is a proper mixture.
So what of the information processing abilities of D-
CTCs and other non-linear theories? If the “realistic”
mixed input to such a device is ontologically a proper
mixture, then the action on pure state inputs should gen-
eralise to the mixed state input as the device is acting on
ontological states and is unaware of any particular ob-
server’s ignorance, so the device behaves as advertised.
On the other hand, if the mixed input is improper, then,
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as pointed out in Ref. [50], one cannot generalise in this
way.
To illustrate, suppose that the input to some non-linear
information processing device is selected by performing
some projective quantum measurement on a separate sys-
tem. In Everettian quantum theory the resulting mixed
state is a macroscopic superposition of which only one
branch is experienced, and so the input to the machine is
ontologically an improper mixture. On the other hand, in
quantum theory with objective state collapse the result-
ing input is a proper mixture. The behaviour the device
would therefore be different depending on the ontology.
4. Signalling
Since all non-linear evolutions treat proper and im-
proper mixtures differently, then so long as this differ-
ence is observable it will lead to an entanglement de-
tector : a device capable of telling whether or not a sys-
tem is entangled with another. In any interpretation that
involves instantaneous disentanglement by measurement
then an entanglement detector necessarily allows superlu-
minal signalling [53, §3.1.3]. D-CTCs and P-CTCs there-
fore lead to superluminal signalling with such an inter-
pretation.
Instantaneous disentanglement is not a necessary fea-
ture of quantum measurement, however. There are many
interpretations that do not require instantaneous dis-
entanglement. Moreover, one can construct alternat-
ive models of quantum measurement that prevent su-
perluminal signalling in non-linear theories by construc-
tion without subscribing to a particular interpretation
[54, 55]. So whilst non-linearity does not necessarily lead
to signalling, it may do depending on the ontology [53,
§3].
As well as this, P-CTCs seem to allow another form of
non-locality due to dynamical consistency paradoxes. If
one accepts that evolutions leading to dynamical consist-
ency paradoxes are disallowed, then this is to say that the
future existence of a P-CTC will affect measurements be-
fore that P-CTC comes into existence in order to avoid
the paradox [23]. However, this type of non-locality is
not observable as dynamical consistency paradoxes with
P-CTCs disappear as soon as noise is added.
5. Distinguishing Non-orthogonal States
Both D-CTCs and P-CTCs are capable of distinguish-
ing non-orthogonal pure states using a single measure-
ment [23, 56], an impossibility in standard quantum the-
ory [14]. This is neatly illustrated by considering the
single-qubit distinguishing circuit : a standard form cir-
cuit with m = n = 1 and U = CHCR,CV SWAP, where
CHCR,CV is the controlled-Hadamard gate controlled on
the CR qubit [23, 56].
Implementing the distinguishing circuit with a D-CTC,
it is simple to check that ρi = |0〉〈0| ⇒ τ = |0〉〈0| ⇒ ρf =
|0〉〈0| and ρi = |−〉〈−| ⇒ τ = |1〉〈1| ⇒ ρf = |1〉〈1|. This
D-CTC therefore renders the non-orthogonal states |0〉
and |−〉 distinguishable by a computational basis meas-
urement.
Implementing the same distinguishing circuit with a
P-CTC one can easily verify that the P-CTC operator P
of Eq. (9) is P = TrCV U = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈−|. Therefore,
this P-CTC maps |+〉 → |0〉 and |1〉 → |1〉, rendering the
non-orthogonal states |+〉 and |1〉 distinguishable.
References [23, 56] give general recipes for constructing
maps for D-CTC and P-CTC circuits respectively that
will map sets of non-orthogonal states onto sets of or-
thogonal states, so that the original states can be distin-
guished by a single measurement. In this way, D-CTCs
can distinguish non-orthogonal states from any specified
finite set of pure states, allowing D-CTCs to violate the
Holevo bound of classical communication over a quantum
channel [56, 57]. Since P-CTCs are only renormalisation
non-linear, they are limited to only distinguishing pure
states from a linearly independent set and therefore can-
not break the Holevo bound in this way.
6. Cloning and Deleting
Distinguishability of non-orthogonal states from an ar-
bitrarily large set enables arbitrarily precise identification
of any state. Therefore, cloning with D-CTCs is possible
with arbitrarily high fidelity by simply identifying a state
and then preparing new copies of it. More practical ap-
proaches to cloning using D-CTCs are presented in Refs.
[58, 59]. However neither cloning method produces clones
with the same entanglement correlations as the original,
which is forbidden by monogamy of entanglement [60].
It is possible to use a P-CTC circuit with a single CV
qubit to perform any postselected quantum measurement
[23]. It is for this reason that P-CTCs have the computa-
tional power of PP, as discussed in Sec. III B 3. This also
means that P-CTCs trivially violate the no-deleting the-
orem [61], which forbids any process that takes two copies
of an unknown pure quantum state and results in a single
copy of the same state with the second system in some
standard “blank” state. By simply performing a postse-
lected measurement, a P-CTC could project the second
system onto the “blank” state, a process that would work
even if the original state was orthogonal to the blank
state by virtue of any small noise, as discussed in Sec.
III B 1.
The processes of copying and deleting are dual to
one another, and the impossibility of each in ordinary
quantum theory follows due to linearity.
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IV. NEW THEORIES
Having developed the theories of D-CTCs and P-
CTCs, the question now arises as to what other theor-
ies of quantum mechanics with time travel there might
be and how they might compare to these existing ex-
amples. Before developing some new theories, it is use-
ful to first review some background on integrating over
quantum states.
A. Integrals over Quantum States
1. Pure States
Given a quantum system, pure states of that system
are described as unit vectors |φ〉 in a Hilbert space H,
such that unit vectors equal up to a phase factor are
considered equivalent: |φ〉 ∼ eiθ|φ〉. For finite dimH = d,
the projective space P(H) def= CPd−1 contains all of the
distinct pure states of that system [62].
For some scalar function I : H → C consider the in-
tegral over the physical states
I =
∫
P(H)
d[φ] I(φ), (15)
where the integration measure d[φ] is yet to be defined.
Conveniently, there exists a unique natural measure over
P(H) invariant under unitary transformations given by
taking a random unitary matrix distributed according to
the Haar measure on the group U(d) [63]. Such a measure
is usefully written in the Hurwitz parametrisation [62–64]
defined with respect to an orthonormal basis {|α〉}d−1α=0 on
H such that any pure state |φ〉 may be uniquely written
in the form
|φ〉 =
1∏
β=d−1
sin θβ |0〉
+
d−2∑
α=1
eiϕα cos θα
α+1∏
β=d−1
sin θβ |α〉
+ eiϕd−1 cos θd−1|d− 1〉, (16)
with parameters θα ∈ [0, π/2] and ϕα ∈ [0, 2π). In this
parametrisation, the integration measure takes the form
d[φ(θα, ϕα)] =
d−1∏
α=1
cos θα(sin θα)
2α−1dθαdϕα. (17)
Equation (17) is unique up to a multiplicative constant.
As noted above, this natural measure is invariant un-
der unitary operations, so that under |φ〉 → U |φ〉 the
measure transforms as d[φ] → d[Uφ] = d[φ]. It may be
useful to observe that the Hurwitz parametrisation is a
generalisation of the Bloch sphere parametrisation often
used for qubits H = C2. For qubits the measure is, up
to a scalar, the rotationally-invariant area measure on a
sphere:
|φ〉 = sin θ|0〉+ eiϕ cos θ|1〉, (18)
d[φ] ∝ sin(2θ)d(2θ)dϕ. (19)
2. Mixed States
The mixed states of a quantum system with Hilbert
space H and d = dimH are described by density oper-
ators on H that are Hermitian, unit trace, and positive
semi-definite. The space of valid density operators on H
is called D(H) and each operator ρ ∈ D(H) describes a
distinct state.
For some scalar valued function I : D(H)→ C consider
the integral over the density operators on H,
I =
∫
D(H)
d[τ ] I(τ), (20)
for some integration measure d[τ ]. Unlike CPd−1, there
is no unique natural measure on D(H) [62] and so one
has to be chosen, along with a useful way to parametrise
τ . As a result, there is no unique natural way to define
I; it will depend on the choice of measure used.
B. Desirable Features
When considering how a new theory of quantum mech-
anics with time travel might be developed, it is useful to
consider how it might be desirable for such a theory to
behave. Having already developed D-CTCs and P-CTCs
fully it is easier to anticipate potential shortcomings of
any new theory. A list of desirable features is given be-
low. Of course, all desiderata are linked to various philo-
sophical prejudices, but there is still utility in considering
them.
1. The theory should have physical motivation and
have a physical interpretation.
2. The theory should reproduce standard quantum
mechanics well enough to be consistent with cur-
rent observations. In the case of CTCs it should
reproduce quantum mechanics locally along the
CTC, as well as in spacetime regions far from the
CTC. It is also expected to be locally approxim-
ately consistent with special relativity and relativ-
istic causal structure. Specifically, it should not
allow superluminal signalling.
3. The theory should be dynamically consistent for all
choices of U and ρi. In other words, it should not
have disallowed evolutions that lead to dynamical
consistency paradoxes.
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4. The theory should specify ρf uniquely given U
and ρi. If multiple possible output states are con-
sidered, then probabilities for each of these should
be specified. In other words, it should not have
uniqueness ambiguities that lead to information
paradoxes (Sec. II B).
5. The theory should specify a state τ that travels
back in time; this should either be uniquely spe-
cified or an ensemble of possibilities with corres-
ponding probabilities should be uniquely specified.
6. Given a pure ρi, prejudice might require either or
both of ρf and τ to also be pure.
7. The theory should not be able to distinguish non-
orthogonal states in a single measurement, neither
should it be able to clone arbitrary quantum states.
Feature 1 is the most subtle of these, and is discussed for
D-CTCs and P-CTCs in Secs. III A 2 and III B 2 respect-
ively.
D-CTCs have feature 2 so long as ontological assump-
tions regarding collapse are made that rule out super-
luminal signalling. P-CTCs only have feature 2 in the
presence of finite noise, and even then similar assump-
tions about collapse are required to rule out signalling.
However, as noted in Sec. III C 4, adding any non-linear
evolution to quantum mechanics opens up the possibility
of signalling in this way.
Feature 3 is owned by D-CTCs but not P-CTCs, while
feature 4 is definitely owned by P-CTCs but is only
owned by D-CTCs by adding an extra postulate (unique-
ness with D-CTCs may also be gained by finite noise, as
conjectured in Sec. III A 1).
Neither the theory of D-CTCs nor P-CTCs fully has
feature 5. P-CTCs do not specify any τ , while D-CTCs
specify τ but not necessarily uniquely. Feature 6 is per-
haps the least compelling feature listed and is one that
neither D-CTCs nor P-CTCs have. Feature 7 is also not
one respected by either P-CTCs or D-CTCs.
It is a lot to ask for a theory to satisfy these desiderata.
Notably, the standard way of introducing time travel into
classical mechanics does not satisfy 2, 3, 4, or 5. However,
since it is not clear how to proceed with constructing its
quantum analogue, such a list may be a helpful guide.
C. A Selection of New Theories
With the above desiderata in mind, new theories of
quantum mechanics with time travel may be constructed.
In this section two overlapping classes of new theories are
considered: weighted D-CTCs and transition probability
theories. An example of the latter, dubbed T-CTCs, is
selected for further study.
Weighted D-CTCs represent an extension of the the-
ory of D-CTCs. These are described by parametrising
the convex subset of density operators τα allowed by the
consistency condition (2) with α, and then assigning a
weight wα ≥ 0 to each. The weighted mixture of these
is then used for τ =
∫
dαwατα/
∫
dαwα. The D-CTC
protocol can then be used with this uniquely determined
choice of τ . One basic example would be to weight all
possibilities equally wα = 1, giving a uniform weighted
D-CTC theory. There is a whole class of theories on
this theme, from different choices of the weights to only
taking the mixture over a subset of the τα (perhaps tak-
ing a mixture of the τα with the minimum entropy). In
terms of the desirable features listed, this theory would
gain features 4 and 5 at least, possibly at the expense of
feature 1 depending on the details and motivation of the
theory. Such a theory is essentially that of D-CTCs, with
an alternative to the maximum entropy rule.
Transition probability theories make use of some use-
ful intuition from standard quantum mechanics. It is
common to say that the probability of an initial state
|I〉 to transition into a final state |F 〉 under the unit-
ary transformation V is given by the transition probab-
ility |〈F |V |I〉|2. More precisely, what is meant is that
|〈F |V |I〉|2 is the Born rule probability of finding the sys-
tem in state |F 〉 if one were to measure the system to
see if it were in state |F 〉 after the transformation. As
an example of this useful way of thinking consider start-
ing with a bipartite system, initially in state |ψi〉|φ〉, and
act upon it with the unitary U ; the “probability of find-
ing the second system in |φ〉” after the transformation is
p(φ) = ‖〈φ|U |ψi〉|φ〉‖2 [77].
There is no unique way to generalise the transition
probability to mixed states ρ and τ . One option is to
use the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product Tr[ρτ ], which is
the probability for ρ to be found in an eigenstate of the
proper mixture τ and for τ to be a realisation of that
same eigenstate, averaged over all eigenstates of τ . An-
other way to think about this is that if ρ is measured
using some POVM which has an element τ , then the
probability of the corresponding result being obtained is
Tr[ρτ ] [14]. Another option is the square of the fidel-
ity [65], Eq. (36), the interpretation of which involves
considering ρ as an improper mixture on which a meas-
urement is performed by projective measurement of the
larger purified system. Both of these options reduce to
the transition probability in the case of both states being
pure. The use of any mixed state transition probability
must be motivated by its operational meaning in context.
For the remainder of this paper it will be assumed that
the appropriate generalisation of transition probability
to mixed states is the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product, so
that the probability for a bipartite system initially in
the state ρi ⊗ τ to have the second system found in the
state τ after some unitary transformation U is given by
p(τ) = Tr
[
τU(ρi ⊗ τ)U †
]
[78].
The transition probability theories are the specific the-
ories obtained by applying these ideas to time travel. The
choices that need to be made to be define a specific the-
ory include: whether pure or mixed CV states are used,
which |φ〉 or τ are to be considered, and how ρf should
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be separated from the CV system?
The following is an example of a transition probability
theory that is also a weighted D-CTC theory. That is,
choose the weights of a weighted D-CTC theory to be the
transition probabilities: wα = p(τα) = Tr[τ
2
α]. Therefore,
the equation of motion is
ρf =
∫
dαTr
[
τ2α
]
TrCV
[
U(ρi ⊗ τα)U †
]∫
dαTr [τ2α]
. (21)
Another collection of transition probability theories is
found by integrating over all possible initial CV states,
weighted by the corresponding transition probability, and
so
τi = Z
−1
∫
P(HCV)
d[φ] p(φ)|φ〉〈φ| (22)
is used if pure CV states are considered, or similarly with
an integral over D(HCV) if mixed CV states care con-
sidered. Z > 0 normalises the state τi and p(φ) is the
transition probability as described above. There are two
options for then specifying ρf : Either take the partial
trace as with D-CTCs or use the same partial projection
used to calculate the transition probability. The first
of these, using pure CV states, gives a theory with the
equation of motion
ρf = Z
−1
∫
d[φ] p(φ)TrCV
[
U(|ψi〉〈ψi| ⊗ |φ〉〈φ|)U †
]
,
(23)
which is one of various theories on this theme.
Another such transition probability theory is the the-
ory of T-CTCs, which is the theory found by integrating
over all pure CV states, weighted by transition probabil-
ity, but using the partial projection to find ρf . T-CTCs
are developed fully below in Sec. IVE, complete with
a discussion of their physical motivation and interpreta-
tion. Some of the other theories that are variations on
this theme are briefly considered in Sec. IVE6.
D. The Uniqueness Ambiguity and Epistemic
Reasoning
Before proceeding to detail the theory of T-CTCs,
some remarks are in order about the uniqueness ambi-
guity. In Sec. II B this ambiguity was introduced as a
necessary and sufficient condition for a theory to suffer
information paradoxes, as defined in that section. The
argument hinges on the idea that if the final state is
uniquely determined by the initial state and dynamics,
then what has occurred is regarded as a (possibly very
powerful) computation and is therefore not paradoxical
according to that definition.
The argument still holds if the unique final state is an
epistemic state, so long as the probabilities in the epi-
stemic state are determined by the physics rather than
purely epistemic principles. If the probabilities are phys-
ically determined then any new information obtained can
be viewed as being due to a probabilistic computation.
For any particular final state to be likely, the physics
must not only establish that final state as a possibil-
ity, but also that the corresponding probability is suf-
ficiently high. Models for probabilistic computation are
well-established and certainly not paradoxical.
Compare this to D-CTCs without either noise or the
maximum entropy rule. In Sec. III A 1 it was claimed
that the theory of D-CTCs contains the uniqueness am-
biguity and therefore suffers from information paradoxes.
This is different from a probabilistic computation since
D-CTCs assign no probabilities to the possible final
states; they are merely left as possibilities.
Therefore, as far as the definitions in Sec. II B go,
information paradoxes are still avoided if uniqueness am-
biguity is avoided; viz., when a unique physically determ-
ined epistemic state is specified. It is for this reason that
requirements 4 and 5 of Sec. IVB allow for uniquely
specified epistemic states.
For example, suppose a time travel circuit is designed
to produce previously unknown theorems. If this circuit
produces unique theorems with certainty from the input,
then, as discussed in Sec. II B, this is a type of compu-
tation: a novel automated theorem prover. Similarly, if
the circuit produces one of a selection of possible theor-
ems from the input, each with a given probability, then
the circuit is performing a (possibly novel) probabilistic
computation. On the other hand, if a theory allows for a
circuit that could produce one of a range of possible the-
orems but has no way of giving the probability of each
obtaining, then that is an information paradox.
E. T-CTCs
The theory of T-CTCs may be motivated as follows.
Consider a CR observer watching a standard form time
travel circuit evolve and suppose that the primitive states
of quantum theory are pure states.
This observer watches a CV system emerge from the
future in some unknown pure state |φ〉. This is then ob-
served to interact with a CR system, initially in state
|ψi〉, via unitary U . The CV system then proceeds to
head back in time. At this point, the observer may
judge whether any given |φ〉 is a consistent initial CV
state. If someone were to have measured the CV sys-
tem immediately before it travelled back in time, then
the probability of their finding that any given |φ〉 is a
consistent initial state is p(φ) = ‖〈φ|U |ψi〉|φ〉‖2. So for
any pair |φ1〉 and |φ2〉, the former would be found to
be consistent p(φ1)/p(φ2) times more often than the lat-
ter. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that |φ1〉
is p(φ1)/p(φ2) times more likely to have been the initial
state than |φ2〉. The observer therefore considers τi as
a proper mixture over all |φ〉 ∈ P(HCV), each weighted
by p(φ), Eq. (22). On the other hand, consistency de-
mands that if |φ〉 was the initial CV state, then on head-
ing back in time the CV system must be found to be
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in the same state again. So the observer can describe
the final state of the CR system in each case by the
partial projection 〈φ|U |ψi〉|φ〉/ ‖〈φ|U |ψi〉|φ〉‖2 consistent
with this being the case. The resulting final state for the
CR system is, therefore,
ρf = Z
−1
∫
d[φ]Uφ|ψi〉〈ψi|U †φ, (24)
Uφ = 〈φ|U |φ〉, (25)
Z =
∫
d[φ] 〈ψi|U †φUφ|ψi〉, (26)
where the operator Uφ acts only onHCR and the constant
Z > 0 is defined to normalise ρf .
Similar arguments may be used to motivate other the-
ories, such as some of the other transition probability
theories mentioned in Sec. IVC. The above is not inten-
ded as a derivation, but a motivational explanation for
T-CTCs akin to those given for D-CTCs and P-CTCs.
As with those theories, T-CTCs are defined by the Eqs.
(24-26) rather than by any interpretation.
Several features of the theory immediately follow from
the definition in Eqs. (24-26). First, it is a non-unitary
and non-linear theory. Second, it is only renormalisation
non-linear and as such it only gives rise to continuous
evolutions. Third, there is no ambiguity in the equation
of motion (24), so there is no uniqueness ambiguity and
no information paradoxes. Before proceeding to consider
what other features T-CTCs may have, it is first neces-
sary to show that T-CTCs satisfy some basic consistency
requirements. It is also convenient to re-write Eq. (24)
in a simpler form.
1. Basic Requirements
Any reasonable theory of quantum mechanics with
time travel should satisfy some basic consistency criteria,
and it is necessary to show that T-CTCs satisfy them too
before proceeding. Needless to say, both D-CTCs and P-
CTCs satisfy these criteria.
The first is that if the identity is applied to the CV
system, then the equation of motion should just reduce to
ordinary quantum unitary evolution. To see this, suppose
U = V ⊗W separates on the CR and CV systems. Then
Uφ = 〈φ|W |φ〉V and the CR system factorises out of the
integral so that ρf = V |ψi〉〈ψi|V † as required.
The second is to show that the point at which the
projection occurs makes no difference. This is equivalent
to saying that there is no observable dynamical ambiguity
in this theory, in the sense discussed in Secs. III A and
III B 2 for D-CTCs and P-CTCs respectively. This can be
seen by considering the transformations U → U(1⊗W )
and U → (1 ⊗W )U for some W that only acts on the
CV system. By unitary invariance of the measure, one
sees that both transformations have the same result, so it
does not matter whether one appliesW before or after U
(equivalently, before or after the transition probabilities
were calculated).
2. Simplification of the T-CTC Equation of Motion
The equation of motion (24) for T-CTCs in its current
form is rather opaque. In order to more easily calculate
with the theory, it is useful to perform the integration in
generality and therefore simplify the equation.
Let {|α〉}d−1i=0 be an orthonormal basis for the d-
dimensional CV system and expand the unitary U in the
Kronecker product form in this basis U =
∑
α,β Aαβ ⊗
|α〉〈β|, where Aαβ are operators on the CR system. In
this form the equation of motion is
ρf = Z
−1 ∑
α,β,γ,δ
I(αβ)(γδ)Aαβ |ψi〉〈ψi|A†γδ, (27)
having defined the integrals
I(αβ)(γδ) =
∫
d[φ] 〈φ|α〉〈β|φ〉〈φ|δ〉〈γ|φ〉. (28)
Now consider expanding both d[φ] and |φ〉 in the Hur-
witz parametrisation [Eqs. (16,17)] with respect to the
same basis. Since, for each α, dϕα factorises out of the
measure, any integrand in which the only ϕα-dependence
is an integer power of eiϕα will integrate to zero. Consid-
ering the integrals in Eq. (28), every integrand will have
such a phase factor unless one or both of the following
conditions is met: α = β and γ = δ, or α = γ and β = δ.
In these cases, all phase factors will cancel out and the
phase integrals will not come to zero. Discarding the zero
integrals in Eq. (27) it is, therefore, found that
ρf = Z
−1

∑
α6=β
I(αβ)(αβ)Aαβ |ψi〉〈ψi|A†αβ
+
∑
α6=β
I(αα)(ββ)Aαα|ψi〉〈ψi|A†ββ
+
∑
α
I(αα)(αα)Aαα|ψi〉〈ψi|A†αα
)
. (29)
By unitary invariance of the integration measure one
may rotate |φ〉 in each of these integrals so that only the
|d − 1〉 and |d − 2〉 components contribute, so that for
α 6= β
I(αβ)(αβ) = I(αα)(ββ) =
∫
d[φ] |〈φ|d − 1〉|2|〈φ|d − 2〉|2
= (2π)d−1
(∫ d−3∏
γ=1
cos θγ(sin θγ)
2γ−1dθγ
)
×
∫
dθd−1dθd−2 cos3 θd−1 cos3 θd−2 sin2d−1 θd−1 sin2d−5 θd−2
(30)
15
where in the final line the integrand has been expanded
out in the Hurwitz parametrisation. Similarly
I(αα)(αα) =
∫
d[φ] |〈φ|d − 1〉|4
= (2π)d−1
(∫ d−3∏
γ=1
cos θγ(sin θγ)
2γ−1dθγ
)
×
∫
dθd−1dθd−2 cos5 θd−1 cos θd−2 sin2d−3 θd−1 sin2d−5 θd−2.
(31)
By evaluating the final lines of Eqs. (30) and (31) it is
seen that, for α 6= β, I(αα)(αα)/I(αβ)(αβ) = 2. So that
from Eq. (29) one finds
ρf ∝
∑
α,β
(
Aαβ |ψi〉〈ψi|A†αβ +Aαα|ψi〉〈ψi|A†ββ
)
. (32)
Finally, note the following identities, which may
readily be verified by expanding the traces: P
def
=
TrCV U =
∑
α Aαα and
∑
α,β Aαβ |ψi〉〈ψi|A†αβ =
TrCV
[
U (|ψi〉〈ψi| ⊗ 1)U †
]
. Using these, and introducing
a normalising scalar z > 0 (which is generally different
from Z used before), the final form of the equation of
motion becomes
ρf = z
−1
(
P |ψi〉〈ψi|P † + dTrCV
[
U
(
|ψi〉〈ψi| ⊗ 1
d
)
U †
])
.
(33)
Equation (33) is in a much more revealing form than
Eq. (24). It shows that the T-CTC equation of motion is
a weighted mixture of the corresponding P-CTC equation
of motion (9) with an ordinary quantum channel. This
can give the impression that T-CTCs are akin to noisy
P-CTCs.
3. Paradoxes
The theory of T-CTCs is always dynamically consist-
ent. This may be seen directly from the equation of mo-
tion in the form of Eq. (33). Even though it is possible
for P |ψi〉 = 0, the second term will always give rise to
a non-zero density operator. Since it has already been
seen that T-CTCs do not suffer uniqueness ambiguities,
it follows that T-CTCs contain neither type of paradox
identified in Sec. II B. Unlike P-CTCs and D-CTCs, no
noise or extra rule is required to avoid these paradoxes.
For example, consider applying Eq. (33) to the un-
proven theorem circuit of Sec. II B. For this circuit,
P = |0〉B〈0| ⊗ |0〉M 〈0|+ |0〉B〈1| ⊗ |1〉M 〈1|
+ |1〉B〈1| ⊗ |0〉M 〈1|+ |1〉B〈0| ⊗ |1〉M 〈0| (34)
and therefore P |00〉BM = |00〉BM + |11〉BM . It is
also easily found that TrCV
[
U(|00〉BM 〈00| ⊗ 1)U †
]
=
|00〉BM 〈00| + |11〉BM 〈11|. Substituting these into Eq.
(33) the output the unproven theorem T-CTC circuit is,
therefore,
ρf =
1
2
|00〉BM 〈00|+ 1
4
|00〉BM 〈11|
+
1
4
|11〉BM 〈00|+ 1
2
|11〉BM 〈11|. (35)
This same result may also be found, with rather more
effort, directly from the integral expression Eq. (24).
4. Computation
Basic conclusions on the computational power of T-
CTCs follow directly from Eq. (33). The second term
is realisable in ordinary quantum mechanics, and so is
limited to the power of BQP, while the first term is the
P-CTC equation of motion. Since BQP ⊆ PP it follows
that T-CTCs cannot efficiently solve any problems that
are not contained within PP. There may be problems in
PP that they are not able to solve efficiently, so P-CTCs
are at least as powerful as T-CTCs and may be strictly
more powerful.
Moreover, the form of Eq. (33) suggests that T-CTCs
may be less powerful than P-CTCs. This is because, for
a T-CTC, ρf is only a pure state if either P |ψi〉 = 0 or
if the two terms in Eq. (33) are equal. So every T-CTC
algorithm that outputs a pure state is achievable on an
ordinary quantum computer in exactly the same way. It
would require great cunning to design an algorithm for
a T-CTC-equipped computer that made computational
use of the first term in Eq. (33). This observation also
prevents T-CTCs from being able to perform an arbitrary
postselected quantum measurement, since many postse-
lected measurement outcomes are pure states. Therefore,
one cannot prove that T-CTCs have the power of PP in
the same way as seen for P-CTCs in Sec. III B 3.
5. Mixed States and Non-linearity
In Sec. III C it was noted that both improper and true
mixtures are validly described with density operators in
non-linear extensions of quantum theory, and that the
purification still holds so that ρi = |ψi〉〈ψi| may always
be assumed. This remains true in the theory of T-CTCs.
It also remains true that proper mixtures are not validly
described by density operators and that non-linearity of
T-CTCs opens the possibility of creating an entangle-
ment detector and therefore the possibility of signalling
exactly as with D-CTCs and P-CTCs.
Another consequence of non-linearity is that both D-
CTCs and P-CTCs are capable of distinguishing non-
orthogonal states in a single measurement. However, it
is now seen that this is not the case with T-CTCs.
Consider the problem of distinguishing between two
states ρ and σ. The probability of success when using
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a single optimal measurement is given by 12 [1 +D(ρ, σ)],
where D(ρ, σ)
def
= 12 Tr |ρ−σ| is the trace distance between
the states [66]. Therefore, ρ and σ are perfectly distin-
guishable in a single measurement if and only ifD(ρ, σ) =
1.
Another measure of distinguishability of states is the
the fidelity between ρ and σ, defined as [14]
F (ρ, σ)
def
= Tr
√
ρ1/2σρ1/2. (36)
In the case of pure states |a〉 and |b〉, the Fidelity takes
on the particularly simple form F (|a〉, |b〉) = |〈a|b〉|.
So, suppose one wishes to distinguish quantum states
using a T-CTC. Only pure state inputs need be con-
sidered, so what is required is a bound on the distin-
guishability of the output states of some T-CTC circuit,
ρaf and ρ
b
f , for which the input states were |a〉 and |b〉,
respectively. Note first that trace distance is bounded by
fidelity [14]
D(ρaf , ρ
b
f) ≤
√
1− F (ρaf , ρbf)2. (37)
It is then useful to separate the terms of ρa,bf seen in Eq.
(33). Therefore, write ρψf = (1 − λψ)σψ + λψτψ , where
τψ = Tr[U(|ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ 1d )U †] and
λψ =
d
d+ ‖P |ψ〉‖2 ≥
1
d+ 1
(38)
where the inequality is a result of Eq. (10). Using strong
concavity and monotonicity of fidelity under quantum
operations [14] it is seen that
F (ρaf , ρ
b
f ) ≥
√
λaλbF (τa, τb)
≥
√
λaλbF (|a〉, |b〉) ≥ 1
d+ 1
|〈a|b〉|. (39)
Finally, observe that by Eqs. (37-39)
D(ρaf , ρ
b
f ) ≤
√
1− |〈a|b〉|
2
(d+ 1)2
≤ 1, (40)
with equality to unity only possible if 〈a|b〉 = 0.
This proves that the output states of a T-CTC circuit
are only perfectly distinguishable from one another in a
single measurement if the input states were. It leaves
open the question as to whether one may use T-CTCs to
probabilistically distinguish non-orthogonal states with
greater success than standard quantum mechanics.
It is comparatively very simple to observe that T-CTCs
are incapable of cloning pure states. A pure state clon-
ing machine always outputs a pure state. Since any T-
CTC outputting a pure state can be simulated exactly
by an ordinary quantum operation, then the no-cloning
theorem for T-CTCs is simply a result of the no-cloning
theorem in ordinary quantum theory. In exactly the same
way, it also immediately follows that T-CTCs are incap-
able of deleting arbitrary pure states. However, the ques-
tion as to whether mixed states can be broadcast [67] is
left open.
6. Relation to Alternative Theories
Several of the above results for T-CTCs are easily mod-
ified to apply to some of the closely related theories in-
troduced in Sec. IVC.
Consider the modification to T-CTCs where, instead
of integrating over pure CV states, mixed CV states are
integrated over. This represents a class of theories since
there is no unique natural choice for the integration meas-
ure, but it is still possible to deduce some general prop-
erties. Assuming that the chosen integration measure is
unitarily invariant, this theory satisfies the basic require-
ments considered in Sec. IVE1. This theory is also only
renormalisation non-linear and so continuity follows im-
mediately. It is also possible to show that this theory
always defines a unique non-zero ρf for every ρi and U ,
so that the theory suffers neither dynamical consistency
nor information paradoxes [79].
Now consider the modification to T-CTCs expressed
in Eq. (23), where, instead of separating CV and CR
systems by a projection, they are separated by a par-
tial trace. This theory satisfies the basic requirements of
Sec. IVE1 and also always defines a unique non-zero ρf
[80], thus avoiding both dynamical consistency and in-
formation paradoxes. It is not, however, renormalisation
non-linear but polynomial non-linear.
Finally, consider the modification to Eq. (23) where
mixed CV states are integrated over, rather than pure
CV states. This similarly satisfies the basic requirements
of section IVE1, and also always defines a unique non-
zero ρf [81]. It is also polynomial non-linear.
There are, of course, further variations which could be
considered. For example, one could use an alternative
generalisation of transition probability for mixed states,
as discussed in Sec. IVC.
The purpose of this discussion is to show that whilst
T-CTCs were concentrated on above, the other theories
mentioned in Sec. IVC also have reasonable properties
and may be worthy of further development.
V. DISCUSSION
Non-linear extensions of quantum theory are subtle
since the long-standing plurality of co-existing interpret-
ations is broken. When considering time travel this mani-
fests itself in two ways. The first is in the development
and motivation of various possible theories: Ontological
bias will affect decisions made. The second is in using
those theories: Mixed states with ontological differences
but the same density operator may behave differently, as
discussed in Sec. III C. Neither of these issues arise when
considering time travel classically, since ontology is gen-
erally clear and non-linear evolutions are commonplace.
This uniquely quantum issue has both positive and
negative effects on the theories. The way in which
quantum theory works allows theories of time travel that
do not suffer from the paradoxes that are present clas-
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sically, but which generally break some of the central
structure of quantum theory. Distinguishability of non-
orthogonal states, state cloning/deleting, and the spectre
of superluminal signalling all present themselves. It also
appears that computational power is greatly increased
even beyond that of quantum computers.
Having set out the current state of research into the
quantum circuit approach to time travel, the shortcom-
ings of D-CTCs and P-CTCs are summarised in Sec.
IVB. Most troubling is that both D-CTCs and P-CTCs
suffer from paradoxes (of the information and dynamical
consistency types respectively), and whilst both could
perhaps be eliminated by arbitrarily small noise the the-
ories themselves remain paradoxical. The two classes of
new theories presented in Sec. IVC were designed to
avoid these paradoxes, and hopefully also satisfy many
of the other desiderata of Sec. IVB.
Of the new theories, that of T-CTCs has been selected
due to its physical motivation. To illustrate the strength
of the physical story told in Sec. IVE, consider applying
the same reasoning in a classical context.
A CR observer watching a classical time travel circuit
sees a CV system in an unknown ontic state τ˜i emerge
from the future, interact with a CR system in a known
state, and then disappear back to the past in the ontic
state τ˜f . For each τ˜i, the observer knows that when it
heads back in time it must be found to be in the same
state. Whilst in quantum mechanics the probability of
finding a system in a given state is given by the transition
probability, the corresponding probability classically is
either unity or zero: Either τ˜i = τ˜f or τ˜i 6= τ˜f . So when
the CR observer takes a probability distribution over all
possible CV states τ˜i, the only states to which non-zero
probabilities are assigned are precisely those states for
which τ˜i = τ˜f after the interaction. What is missing from
this account is a way of specifying the exact probabilities
assigned to each CV state. One might choose to use
the principle of indifference and weight each possibility
equally, but this in not necessary.
A very similar argument could be used to argue in fa-
vour of D-CTCs, for example, by demanding exact equal-
ity of reduced density operators rather than consistency
via the transition probability. In this case, using the
principle of indifference would lead to a result that is
equivalent to the uniform weighted D-CTCs mentioned
in Sec. IVC. However, by accepting the interpretation
of transition probabilities, and supposing that only pure
states are primitive, T-CTCs do have a clear physical
motivation.
Of course, this not a cast-iron argument for T-CTCs,
and there is a certain amount of vagueness in the descrip-
tion given in Sec. IVE. Similar interpretational vague-
ness is found with both D-CTCs and P-CTCs, and should
be expected when attempting to extend quantum mech-
anics, which lacks consensus on interpretation, to a non-
linear regime that is so alien to it.
These arguments for the classical model and uniform
weighted D-CTCs differ from the argument for T-CTCs
in an important respect. The probabilities assigned to
the different possible histories with T-CTCs are physic-
ally determined: They are proportional to the transition
probabilities. On the other hand, in the above discussion
of classical model and D-CTCs using the same narrative
there is no physical assignment of probabilities. The use
of principle of indifference is an epistemic move, not a
physical one.
Consider the desirable features listed in Sec. IVB in
the light of the theory of T-CTCs. The above argument
aims to satisfy feature 1. As with D- and P-CTCs, fea-
ture 2 is satisfied so long as an appropriate ontology of
measurement is chosen (Sec. III C 4). Features 3, 4, and 5
are satisfied without condition, as discussed in Sec. IVE.
Feature 6 is partially satisfied, in that both τ and ρf are
considered ontologically pure, but since a proper mix-
ture is taken over so many possibilities, the mathemat-
ical form of either is very rarely pure. In Sec. IVE5
it is shown that feature 7 is satisfied, although related
questions on distinguishing non-orthogonal states with
greater-than-quantum fidelity and broadcasting of mixed
states are left open.
Does this mean that T-CTCs are a better model for
quantum mechanics with time travel or, more specific-
ally, for quantum mechanics in the presence of CTCs?
Not necessarily. The physical motivation for T-CTCs is
far from a “first principles” argument and there is still
the question as to how, and when, the state projection
occurs. However, both D-CTCs and P-CTCs have in-
complete physical motivations and both leave questions
as to how, and when, exactly a proposed physical change
occurs—all three theories share the unobservable dynam-
ical ambiguity.
The theory of D-CTCs is weakened by the failure of
the equivalent circuit model, as currently presented in
the literature, to hold up to scrutiny since that model
claimed to provide motivation for the D-CTC consistency
condition and the maximum entropy rule (although it
may still be possible to correct this model). However,
the discussion of Sec. III A 1 shows that there is evidence
that the maximum entropy rule may nonetheless arise as
a result of noise. It is an interesting open problem to see
if this can be shown to be true generally, but it would not
rid the theory of the fact that the uniqueness ambiguity
is essentially present.
What has been comprehensively shown is that there
is a whole landscape of other theories out there. The
quantum circuit approach to quantum mechanics with
time travel may be very attractive in that it abstracts
away from knotty problems with spacetime geometry or
any other exact mechanism for time travel, but it is per-
haps too general for the problem at hand. In order to
identify a more robustly physical solution to quantum
mechanics with time travel it may be necessary to use a
different approach, such as path integral or field theoretic
ideas. Alternatively, by very carefully committing to a
specific ontology for quantum mechanics, it may be pos-
sible to identify the corresponding theory of time travel.
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When non-linearity is present vagueness on this point is
problematic.
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